A FEELING OF UNEASE ABOUT PRIVACY LAW
ANN BARTOW!

In response to DanielJ. Solove, A Taxonomy of Priva(y, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 477 (2006).
This essay responds to Daniel Solove's recent article, A Taxonomy
of Privacy. I have read many of Daniel Solove's privacy-related writings, and he has made many important scholarly contributions to the
field. As with his previous works about privacy and the law, it is an interesting and substantive piece of work. Where it falls short, in my estimation, is in failing to label and categorize the very real harms of
privacy invasions in an adequately compelling manner. Most conmentators agree that compromising a person's privacy will chill certain behaviors and change others, but a powerful list of the reasons
why this is a negative phenomenon that the law should seek to prevent
is not a significant attribute of Solove's taxonomy. That omission left
this reader a little concerned about the ultimate usefulness of the privacy framework that Solove has developed. To phrase it colloquially,
in this author's view, the Solove taxonomy of privacy suffers from too
much doctrine, and not enough dead bodies. It frames privacy harms
in dry, analytical terms that fail to sufficiently identify and animate the
compelling ways that privacy violations can negatively impact the lives
of living, breathing human beings beyond simply provoking feelings
of unease.
The word "taxonomy" in the title of the article suggests that the
article will provide a hierarchical list of categories within which independent affronts to privacy can be compartmentalized. Per Solove's
introduction, the proposed introduction is pitched at "provid[ing] a
framework for how the legal system can come to a better
understanding of privacy."2 Solove does not contest the validity of pri-
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vacy torts.3 Instead, he reports that he discerned a need to expand
upon the four categories of privacy torts that were famously articulated by William Prosser.' Like Prosser, Solove breaks privacy down
into four constitutive categories-Solove's are information collection,
information processing, information dissemination, and invasionbut he constructs multiple subgroupings as well.
In one sense, the ultimate test of the value of this undertaking will
be in how widely Solove's taxonomy is referenced and adopted by actors within the legal community. Yet because it is fashioned as a law
review article, rather than a more efficiently perusable treatise, its attractiveness to jurists and practicing attorneys may be limited. 6 It is
arguably pitched most directly at other privacy law scholars, a great
number of whom are quoted and cited by Solove within the text. It is
certainly possible that it will prove a useful conceptual tool for future
research efforts. However, independent-minded contrarians that we
tend to be, it seems unlikely that too many legal scholars will uncritically adhere to Solove's taxonomy on any sort of consistent or wholesale basis. As Solove expressly observes, privacy law is "fragmented
and inconsistent,"' and it is unlikely to smoothly merge into a coherent whole even with Solove's best efforts at taxonomy construction.
W"hat Solove could accomplish someday, given his wide-ranging
knowledge of privacy law, is a catalog of powerful, compelling reasons
why the legal system should care about privacy violations more than it
currently appears to.
Solove has written extensively about privacy in a variety of contexts, having penned a textbook and materials aimed at practitioners
as well as more theoretical works. The law review article of his that I
like best is Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphorsfor Information Privacy, which was published five years ago. s In it Solove re3 But see C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and I/ormalionalPivaj,o Gossip: The Central
Meaning 4 the First Amendment, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 215, 215-16 (2004), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/telecom/bakerautonomyandinforimati
onalprivacy.pdf ("[T]he privacy tort should be ignored.").
Taxonomy, supra note 1, at 483.
Id.at 489.
6 (f Ann Bartow, The Htgemoy n/the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
581, 582
(2004),
available at http://papeis.ssrn.com/sol3/papeis.cfm?abstiact-id-654661
("[M] ajor conceptions about the appropriate structure, texture, and span of copyright
protections and privileges have been fashioned by copyright treatises ... .
7 Taxonomy, suna note 1,
at 562.
8 Daniel J. Solove, Privat and Power: CornputeiDatabases and Mefaphwbsrfin
tn/ormatiti Piivacg, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001) [hereinafter Metapho*j] See also DANIELJ.
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
27-55 (2004) (reprinting the article in revised form).
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jects the "Big Brother" metaphor, in which privacy invasions are conceptualized as largely surveillance-related, and attendant harms are
assumed to flow from the self-censorship that results when people feel
that their private lives are being continually scrutinized. Instead, he
argues that a more apt metaphor can be drawn from Franz Kafka's
novel The Trial,writing:
Kafka's The Trial best captures the scope, nature, and effects
of the type of power relationship created by databases. My
point is not that The Trial presents a more realistic descriptive
account of the database problem than Big Brother. Like
[1984], The Trial presents a fictional portrait of a harrowing
world, often exaggerating certain elements of society in a way
that makes them humorous and absurd. Certainly, most people are not told that they are inexplicably under arrest and
they do not expect to be executed unexpectedly one evening.
The Trial is in part a satire, and what is important for the purposes of my argument are the insights the novel provides
about society through its exaggerations. In the context of
computer databases, Kafka's The Trial is the better focal point
for the discourse than Big Brother. Kafka depicts an indifferent bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not knowing
what is happening, having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control over the process. This lack of control allows the
trial to completely take over Joseph K.'s life. The Trial captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability
one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has
control over a vast dossier of details about one's life. At any
time, something could happen to Joseph K; decisions are
made based on his data, and Joseph K. has no say, no knowledge, and no ability to fight back. He is completely at the
mercy of the bureaucratic process.
As understood in light of the Kafka metaphor, the primary
problem with databases stems from the way the bureaucratic
process treats individuals and their information. It is a problen that is at its heart about the nature of certain relationships in our society and their effects on individuals.
Yet in his privacy harm taxonomy, Solove seems to be moving away
from Kafka and back toward Orwell in his conception of privacy issues. Consider his first subcategory within "Information Collection,"
which he denotes "Surveillance." After parsing the raft of quotations
about surveillance that he provides, one gets the sense that surveillance is a unitary evil that fairly uniformly provokes uneasiness, and
causes self-censorship among the surveilled. The other subcategory,
"Interrogation," framed as the forced disclosure of personal informa-

9 Vleaplhors, supra note 8, at 1421.
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tion, largely overlaps analytically with "Surveillance" in terms of the
iterated harms, which once again are self-restricting effects on behavior and a sense of personal discomfort. Self-censorship and thought
control are the associative impacts.
In The Trial, the protagonist Joseph K is arrested in the very first
sentence."' Willem, one of the men who apprehends Joseph K, tells
him: "Our officials, so far as I know them ... never go hunting for
crime in the populace, but, as the Law decrees, are drawn toward the
guilty and must then send out us warders. That is the Law."'' Joseph
K is presumed to be guilty of something, he just does not know what.
He is victimized by corruption in the police and judiciary, and illserved by an incompetent attorney. The novel powerfully illustrates
the profoundly demoralizing effect that an accusation of crime can
have upon a person. In consequence, "Kafka-esque" is how one might
describe it when a non-dangerous person is not allowed to board an
airplane, despite the purchase of a ticket and acquiescence to security searches, 3 or detained at an airport after a flight. 14 Joseph K. was

10FRANz

KAFKA, THE TRIAL 1 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Schocken
Books

1988) (1925).
IId. at 6.
12 See Posting of Cosmic Iguana to SIVACRACY.net,
http:// ww.nyu.edu/
classes/ siva/ archives/ 000933.htmll (Mar. 21, 2005, 10:27 EST) (discussing a man who
was denied air travel for wearing a shirt with a picture of a gun); Ryan Singel, The Great
No-ID Airfporl Challenge, WIRED NEWS, June 9, 2006, http:// ww.wi-ed.com/news/
technology/0,71115-0.html (discussing security measures for air travel without identification); Woman Booted oft Plight Jor Anti-Bush Shirt, LOCAL6.COM, Oct. 6, 2005,
http://wNNw.local6.com/pit/5066135/detail.html (discussing a woman denied air
travel for wearing an anti-Bush shirt).
3 See Rachel L. Swarns, Senato? Teirorisl? A Watch List Slos Ken nedj at Aiporl,
N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al (discussing misidentification of Senator Kennedy as a terrorist on the list); Paul Boutin, Dis)utedAir ID Law lay Not Exist, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 15,
2002, http://ww.wvired.com/news/plivacy/0,1848,54464,00.html (reporting on a passenger's near-arrest for failure to show identification); Posting to Schneier on Security,
http://www.schneiei.com/blog/aichives/2005/08.html (Aug. 19, 2005) (discussing
the misidentification of children on the terrorist watch list); Ryan Singel, Due Process
Vanishes in Thin Air; WIRED NEws, Apr. 8, 2003, http://Nww.wired.com/
news/privacy/0,1848,58386,00.html (discussing misidentification of people on the terrorist watch list); . Dipesh Gadher, Plane Passengers Shoced by Their X-Ray Scans, TIMES
ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2004, http://wwx.timesonline.co.uk/aiticle/0,2087-1348172,00.html
(discussing the x-ray machines used to check passengers and their bags); Posting of
Edward Hasbrouck to The Practical Nomad,
http://hasbrouck.org/blog/
archives/001065.html (June 6, 2006, 18:58 EST) (discussing rules for identification
and air travel); Lisa Myers et al., Airline Screeners Fail Government Bomb Tests,
MSNBC.coM, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11863165/ (reporting
that federal investigators were able to carry bomb-making materials through airport
security).
14 See, e.g., David Epstein, Another Scholar Turned Back at JTK, INSIDE
HIGHER ED,
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executed at the end of the novel, and his last words described his own
death: "Like a dog!" 15 Very real harms flowed from the "guilty emanations" thatJoseph K. somehow emitted.

In contrast, Winston Smith, the main character in George Orwell's
1984, spends most of the novel trying to escape Big Brother's surveillance, and the uneasy self-censorship to which it leads. Constantly being watched so closely that his observers can practically read his mind
is the trauma against which Winston rebels. Solove's taxonomy characterizes privacy harms as creating a nation of Winstons: people unhappily living with "the assumption that every sound you made was
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized."'"
The consequence of Winston's deviation was official discovery of his

independent thinking, and reprogramming to bring him back into
the groupthink fold. To reframe the example from above, this is why
airport security is labeled "Orwellian" by everyone who flies on commercial airlines, not just those who encounter difficulties.
Even
though travelers may know that they are not legally required to pre-

sent certain documents"' or undergo particular screening rituals that
quite possibly are ineffective' as well as invasive, they generally submit
to authority, and conform to whatever security norms that government agents are promulgating.' Intrusive searches may be unsettling,
but as long as an individual is ultimately able to board her plane, she

June 21, 2006, http:// www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/06/21/milios (describing
the inability of a foreign scholar to enter the United States); Posting of Jeremy Wright
to The End of the Story, http://Nww.ensight.org/aichives/2005/03/17/the-end-ofthe-story/ (Mar. 17, 2005) (discussing the denial of the author's entry into the United
States).
I, KAFKA, supim note 10, at 229.
6 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 3 (iving Howe ed., Harcourt, Brace & World 1963)
(1949).
17 See, e.g., Posting of Siva to SIVACRACY.net,
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/
siva/archives/002939.1mnl (Mar. 24, 2006, 15:03 EST) (asserting that there is no public law requiring travelers to show government-issued identification before boarding a
plane, and anecdotally describing a process for boarding a flight without such docnmentation); Sarah Lai Stirland, hjruoal Suron Shows Lax ID Cheds .fur Air Traveler,
GOVERNMLNT EXECUTIVE, Mar. 23, 2006, http://wNw.govexec.com/dailyfed/0306/
032306tdpml.hnn (confirming that travelers may legally pass through airport security
checkpoints without presenting valid, government-issued identification, provided they
subnit to a secondary screening process).
is See Posting of Michael to Discourse-net, http://wiw.discouirse.net/aichives/
2006/05/tsa-puffery.html (May 3, 2006, 14:52 EST) (arguing that much of the current
airport security regime is "useless"); Lisa Myers et al., stpta note 13 ("[F]ederal investigators recently were able to cairy materials needed to make a ... homemade bomb
through security screening at 21 airports.").
19 See Posting of Brian Tamanaha to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2005/12/undisclosed-prisons-detention-without.html (Dec. 12, 2005, 09:22 EST) (atguing for increased transparency of airport screening regulations).
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is likely to tolerate them, especially if she believes that mounting a
challenge is likely to disrupt her journey. The privacy harms Solove
described in his taxonomy were similar in nature; people feel uneasy
about privacy violations and may change their behaviors to avoid scrutiny or its consequences, but ultimately the main trajectories of their
lives remain logistically undisturbed.
Solove's section on information processing focuses on how information processing (which presumably has been collected through either surveillance or interrogation, since those are the only two choices
the taxonomy proffers) is "handled." He asserts that information is
"aggregated" to develop a profile of a subject, and then "identified,"
by which he means connected to particular individuals. However, he
never explains why identification must follow aggregation. It is possible that things proceed in this order, but it also seems likely that in
many instances identification precedes aggregation, as individuals of
interest are specifically identified as worthy subjects for collection of
portfolios of information. In other words, it may be select pieces of
identifiable information that trigger desires for aggregation (this person appears to be wealthy, so let's find out more about her retail purchasing proclivities), but Solove's taxonomy does not effectively leave
room for this prospect. This is not a terrifically important point substantively, but it does suggest the limitations of taxonomy to the extent
that it imposes a certain rigidity (or at least linearity) of thought about
privacy issues.
The harms of identification and aggregation are intuitively impossible to separate, and Solove wisely declined to attempt to do so. Instead, he points to the fact that in tandem they lead to impairment of
a person's ability to obscure personal information, or to speak or act
anonymously, again leading to chilling effects and uneasiness. This is
precisely the point at which the taxonomy seems to fall short in terms
of its ultimate utility. Why is the possibility that a person will be linked
to her own volitional words and actions a harm that law should pay attention to? Are not the behaviors that get chilled by a fear of accountability likely to be socially undesirable ones? I am sure that Solove has excellent answers to these questions, but I wish he had
integrated them more explicitly into his taxonomy. Like the old clich about it being better that a thousand guilty people go free than
for one innocent individual to be imprisoned, this privacy taxonomy
needs, but lacks, a compelling rhetorical framework that encapsulates
the values at stake in privacy law.
One privacy-related issue that viscerally grabs the public imagination (and for which the public expects assistance from the govern-
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ment) is identity theft."" "Insecurity" is Solove's term for facilitation of
identity theft, which in turn leads to actual theft from a victim, either
directly or by fraudulently imputing debts to her.

Solove appropri-

ately noted that there are specific laws that "require that information
be kept secure."'" He did not, however, choose to make statutory violations a separate taxonomical category, despite the fact that whether
or not a particular type of information insecurity is addressed by statutory authority seems to have a tremendous effect upon whether or not
a court will attribute an actionable harm to an act of insecure information handling. Identity theft is a privacy harm that helps focus attention on privacy violators as heinously bad actors, and away from the
conception of privacy-seekers as those with unwholesome informational agendas. For this reason, Solove could have productively expanded the visibility of identity theft issues in the taxonomy.
Solove next carves out another information handling subcategory,
which he terms "Secondary Use." Certainly identity theft is a form of
secondary use, so the line between the two categories is hazy. How or
why the law should address insecurity independently from the harms
generated by harmful secondary use is never clearly explained by Solove. As with Insecurity, Solove notes that some secondary uses are
governed by targeted statutes, while others are not. Solove characterizes the harms of Secondary Use as causing "fear and uncertainty."""
My guess is that people would primarily be fearful and uncertain
about identity theft in this context, and the very real dangers of resource theft and life disruption that it poses.
"Exclusion" is the subcategory Solove contrived to cabin "failure
to provide individuals with notice and input about their records."2'
The harm of Exclusion is that people do not know what information is

See Federal Trade Comm'n, Take Charge: Fighting Back Against Identity Theft,
http://wv.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/ciedit/idtheft.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2006)
(providing resources for victims of identity theft); Federal Trade Conmnm'n, Your National Resource About ID Theft, http:// ww.consumer.gov/idtheft/ (last visited Aug.
27, 2006) (suggesting ways to "Deter, Detect, and Defend against identity theft"); U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Identity Theft and Fraud, http://,W ..usdoj.gov/criminal/
fLaud/idtheft.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2006) (providing answers to basic questions
about identity fraud); Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Identity Theft Resources,
http://ww.privacyrights.org/identity.htm, (last visited Aug. 27, 2006) (providing links
and fact sheets on identify theft); Social Security Online, Electronic Fact Sheet,
http://wv.ssa.gov/pubs/idtheft.htm (Jan. 2006) (providing links to other government resources for identity theft victims); U.S. Dep't of Edtic., Identity Theft,
http://wwv.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/misused/idtleft.html (last visited Aug. 27,
2006) (providing information about identity theft tailored to students).
21 laxonomy, supra note
1, at 516.
20

22 ld.
at 522.
2, Id.at 523.
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collected about them, what is done with that information, and
whether the information is even correct. Solove explores these harms
in much greater detail in his above-referenced law review article, Phivacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Phi24
vacy.
In his A Taxonomy of Privacy, however, with respect to consequential harms, he simply reiterates negative impacts such as chilling
effects and unease.
Solove's third major category is "Information Dissemination."
Given that he already covered dissemination issues in previous subcategories, particularly Secondary Use, there is substantial overlap between the seven iterated categories and the privacy issues isolated previously. Reading the subcategorical descriptions reminds the reader
that courts primarily act to prevent or punish privacy harms where
there has been a statutory violation or a breach of a duty of confidentiality.
One Information Dissemination subcategory is "Disclosure,"
which Solove asserts differs from "Breach of Confidentiality" because
the harm is somehow different, 2) )ut the distinctions he makes are
somewhat unconvincing. "Damage to Reputation" is certainly a possible harm of disclosure, but how this would arise without dissemination
and secondary use is not explained. This definitional fuzziness illustrates another limitation of a taxonomical approach to privacy law.
The formulation of a taxonomy requires arbitrary line drawing and
forced compartmentalization that could filter into legal practice in
the form of lengthy and redundant pleadings. The taxonomy risks
serving as a shopping list, rather than a menu, for pleadings purposes
for cautious attorneys who would reasonably choose to err in favor of
being overinclusive.
The difficulties and limitations of the taxonomy are further evidenced by Solove's next subcategory, "Exposure." He distinguishes
Exposure from Disclosure based not on the volitional act itself, nor in
terms of the harm, which remains rooted in unease and damage to
self-esteem. Instead, he distinguishes Exposure from Disclosure based
on the information at issue, which he describes as "not revealing of
anything we typically use to judge people's character.""
''hile it is
true that, using his example of unintentional exposure of genitalia,
such an occurrence might not directly underpin a character assessment, the context of the exposure (for example, sexual or excretory
24 Metaphois, stna note 8, at 1424-30.
2) See Taxonomy, stpa note 1, at 531.
26 Id. at 536.
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activities in a public place, wardrobe malfunctions, or failures to close
curtains) might lead to character judgments. The reactions to the inadvertent exposure would certainly Ibe assumed to reflect the character of the exposed. Myriad other concerns are likely to arise. Privacy
did not play a significant role in the public dialogue that followed the
exposure of Janet Jackson's breast during the halftime show of the
2004 Super Bowl. 2' One might expect that a focus on the effect that
an exposure has on viewers or readers would be factored into this privacy harm.
Oddly, Solove lists "Increased Accessibility" as his next subcategory
of privacy violation. This term pertains to information that is already
publicly available, but is somehow rendered even more publicly available by an act that Solove seems to argue may be deemed actionable if
it is harmful. How the law should react to claims related to acts that
enhance the availability of information that the law has either left uncontrolled or has affirmatively recognized a right of public accessibility to is not squarely addressed. Solove no doubt correctly asserts that
information can Iye used for reasons other than those for which law
and policy concerns have made it accessible. He criticizes a binary
approach under which information is either publicly available or not,
suggesting that the law should recognize a middle ground in which a
legally recognized compensable harm can arise from acts that make
publicly accessible information too easily accessible. He stops short,
however, of constructing a subtaxonomy that proposes variable degrees of availability for different forms of information. If he is correct
about the need for a middle ground of accessibility, then it is a project
that needs to be undertaken.
Eventually Solove segues into topics such as blackmail, a subject
that seems to intrigue criminal legal scholars as well as privacy law aficionados, and appropriation, 29 which overlaps with intellectual property constructs. His taxonomy is clearly very thorough in terms of
cataloging the wide variety of contexts in which privacy concerns arise.
It is in the chronicling of associative harms that his approach is disappointing.
Solove consistently accords to violations of information privacy the

27 See, e.g., Hugo Lindgren, II's Prime Time Jor a Decency
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2006, § 4, at 4 (discussing institutional reactions concerning broadcast decency);
Apologetic Jackson Says 'Costume Reveal Went Awm,'
CNN.COM, Feb. 3, 2004, http://
0
www.cnn.com/2004/US/02/02/stipeibowl.jackson/ (discussing the "costume reveal"
and resulting FCC investigation).
28 Taxonomy, supa note 1, at 541. How often "blackmail" cases arise, and
what they
typically involve, are questions I wish Solove had addressed.
29 Id. at 545.
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default harm of feelings of unease and discomfort. Though he occasionally weaves some other negative consequences through his descriptions of his taxonomical categories, he devotes substantially more
energy to explaining causality than lie does to explaining impact.
This renders the taxonomy incomplete and unsatisfactory.
At the most superficial level, persuading observers to take privacy
concerns seriously requires convincing them that people who are not
engaging in illegal conduct are harmed in a significant, cognizable
way when their personal information is collected and distributed
against their will or without their knowledge. Toward this end, a
more effective taxonomy would dramatically and thoroughly document the consequences of privacy violations in very visceral, dramatic
ways.
There is no shortage of potentially gripping hypotheticals that
could be developed. A perceived lack of medical privacy may lead
people to avoid medical testing and treatment. An actual lack of
medical privacy may cause people with particular health problems to
be denied credit, employment, or housing. Real and immediate consequences of privacy violations could be cataloged along with descriptions of the violations themselves.
There are also plenty of real life examples. In Griswold v. Connecticut,3 0 the Supreme Court placed access to contraceptives within the
rubric of a type of privacy that is not readily discerned within Solove's
taxonomy. However, recent practices by certain pharmacies demonstrate an attempt to dissuade women from utilizing certain forms of
contraceptives such as the "morning after" pill by requiring unnecessary and intrusive personal information from those seeking them.
These acts situate reproductive freedom within the realm of information privacy concerns. ,
Roe v. Wade32 initially fashioned access to abortion as a privacy
right, but abortion later evolved into a fundamental freedom, which
manyjurists and legal scholars viewed as a more satisfactory and doctrinally sustainable manner of conceptualizing bodily autonomy. The

381 U.S. 489 (1965).
Compaqmre Posting by Badgerbag to Badgerbag: Messy, Surly, Full of Books,
http://badgeibag.typepad.com/badgerbag/2006/06/callingall-dii.html
(June 8,
2006) (describing the detailed personal information required by a specific pharmacy
f'iom consumers seeking emergency contraception) with Posting of Rocker Mommy to
Rocker Mommy, http://iockermommy.blogspot.com/2005/12/id-like-some-plan-bplease.html (Dec. 27, 2005, 18:20 PST) (describing the ease of access to and lack of
personal information required for emergency contraception at a different pharmacy).
?Q 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
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linkage between abortion and privacy proved resurgent, however,
when authorities attempted to chill abortions by seeking to obtain and
potentially publicize the names of women who have undergone the
procedure. 33 While there are clearly significant detrimental impacts
of generalized feelings of unease, the prospect that women will either
forgo sexual relationships or possibly even bear unwanted children as
a consequence of inadequate information privacy is the sort of harm
Solove's taxonomy could have taken greater notice of, with beneficial
effects.
Solove's A Taxonomy of Privacy is an interesting and worthwhile
undertaking, but its lack of blood and death, or at least of broken
bones and buckets of money, distances privacy harms from other
categories of tort law. It relegates privacy violations to a very low place
in the taxonomy of immediate and visceral public policy concerns,
and foments a feeling of unease about the importance and future of
privacy law.

?"?,
Posting of Daphne Gilbert to Blog*on*nymity: Blogging on the Identity Trial,
http: //www.anonequity.org/weblog/ archives/ 2005 /03 /thepowerofpr_l .php (Mar.
29, 2005, 23:50 EST) (describing various instances in which state and federal attorneys
general sought the medical records of women who had abortions); Watching Justice:
An Eye on the Department of Justice, http://N wvw.watchingjustice.oig/-eports/
brief.phpdocld-177 (Apr. 14, 2004) (reporting the Department of Justice's February
2004 attempt to subpoena the medical records of 2700 women who had abortions).

